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HERBERT LEE CLARK et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. BODO DZIABAS, Defendant and Respondent.
[1] Automobiles-Operation-Care-Defects in Brakes: Defenses:
Burden of Proof-Negligence-Violation of Regulations.-The
duty of the owner and operator of an automobile to maintain
its brakes in compliance with Veh. Code, §§ 26453, 26454, is
nondelegable, and to establish a defense to liability for
damages caused by a brake failure, the owner and operator
must establish not only that he did what might reasonahly be
expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under simiJar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law, but
also that the failure was not due to the negligence of any
agent, whether employee or independent contractor, employed
by him to inspect or repair the brakes.
[2] Id.-Operation-Care-Defects in Brakes: Sufficiency of Evidence-Defective Equipment.-In an action for damages ineurred in an automobile accident caused by a brake failure on
defendant's used car, which he had purchased a year earlier,
the evidence failed to support the judgment for defendant
where defendant had a nondelegable duty to maintain his
brakes in good working order, and where, although he had
rebutted the presumption of his own direct negligence, the
evidence had established neither the negligence nor the
absence of negligence of either or both of the two independent
contractors he had engaged to overhaul and inspect the brake
system before the accident.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Laurence J. Rittenband, Judge. Order affirmed; judgment reversed.
Action to recover damages for injuries to persons and property incurred in an automobile accident. Judgment for defendant reversed.
[1] Automobiles: effect of defective brakes on liability for
injury, note, 14 A.L.R. 1339, 63 A.L.R. 398, 170 A.L.R. 611. See
also, Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Automobiles, §§ 190, 191; Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 351.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §§ 108 (2), 177, 197; [2] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §§ 108(2),220.
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N. E. Youngp]ood and Samuel Schekman for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Edward I. Pollock, Robert E. Cartwright, Theodore A.
Horn, Robert G. Beloud, Leo M. O'Connor and Leonard Sacks
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Betts & I~oomis and Richard F. Runkle for Defendant and
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Lee
Clark brought this action to recover damages for injuries to
their persons and property incurred in an automobile accident. They appeal from an adverse judgment and from an
order denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the issue of liability.
Mr. Clark was driving and Mrs. Clark was riding in the
right front seat at the time of the accident. They had stopped
at an intersection to wait for the traffic signal to change when
defendant's car struck their car from the rear.
pefendant testified that his brakes failed when he stepped
on his brake pedal in response to the traffic signal and plaintiffs' St9PpiIig ahead of him. He swerved to the right but was
unable to ·avoid a collision. He had no reason to know that his
brakes were defective until they failed. The failure was -caused by. a rupture in a hydraulic line that gave defendant
no warning of its impending occurrence. About six months
before the accident he had the brakes overhauled by the automobile agency that had sold him the car, then a 3-year-old
used car, about a year before the accident. About five weeks
before the accident, defendant asked the attendants at the
service station that regularly serviced his car to inspect the
brakes, and there is evidence that they were adjusted at that
time.
One of defendant's expert witnesses testified that the rupture in the hydraulic line was caused by the rubbing of a
shock absorber against the line at a place where it had previously been repaired by soldering. Another of defendant's
expert witnesses testified that the soldering was "very amateurish" and that the line would inevitably leak and eventually fail. There WE-S no evidence of who had soldered the line,
when it had been soldered, or whether or not the defective
soldering or the rubbing by the shock absorber would have
been detected by a reasonable inspection .
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[1] In Maloney v. Rath, S.F. 22596, ante, p. 442 [71
Cal.Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513], we held that the duty of the
owner and operator of an automobile to maintain its brakes in
compliance with the provisions of the Vehicle Code (Veh.
Code, §§ 26453, 26454) is nondelegable. Accordingly, to establish a defense to liability for damages caused by a brake failure, the owner and operator m'ust establish 110t only that" 'he
did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law'" (Maloney v. RatTt, supra,
ante, p. 444) but also that the failure was not owing to the
negligence of any agent, whether employee or independent
contractor, employed by him to inspect or repair the brakes.
[2] In the present case there is no evidence that either or
both of the two independent contractors employed by defendant exercised reasonable care in repairing and inspecting thc
brakes. Either one may have been responsible for the defective
soldering and both may have been negJigent in failing to
detect the defect while inspecting the brakes. Accordingly, the
evidence does not support the:judgment, and it must therefore
be reversed.
.
The specific failure of proof, however, was not called to
defendant's attention at the time plaintiffs moved for a
"'-directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Moreover, unlike Maloney v. Ralh, supra, the record does
not establish that either of defendant's independent contractors was negligent. Accordingly, defendant should be afforded
. an opportunity to prove, if he can, that the defective condi. tion of the brakes that led to their ultimate failure existed
before he purchased the car and would not have been discovered by a reasonable inspection thereafter. Such proof would
establish that neither defendant nor the agents he employed
to maintain his brakes were negligent and that therefore his
nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain his
brakes was not violated.
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court errcd in instructing the jury on alternative theories of liability. They contend
that in addition to the brake failure, defendant's followillg
too close and his failure to use all available means to avoid the
accident after his brakes failed were concurrent proximate
causes of the accident for which the jury could find defendant
liable whether or not it concluded that the brake failure was
excused. They assert that the instructions confused the various theories of liability and that the jury may therefore have
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erroneously concluded that a finding that the brake failure
was excused would also preclude holding defendant liable on
any other theory. Since the judgment must be reversed in any
event, it is unnecessary to consider whether or not any possible confusion in the instructions constituted prejudicial error.
Moreover, since the problem has now been thoroughly exposed,
the parties should have no difficulty in proposing appropriate
modifications of the instructions on retrial to obviate any likelihood of confusion.
The order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed, and the judgment is reversed.
Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan,
J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Frampton in the opinion
prepared by him for the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Three (Clark v. Dziabas, 2 Civ. 30945, filed
February 29,1968, certified for nonpublication).

